2008 Trademark Decisions of the Federal Circuit A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Area Summaries by Kelly, David M. & Bald, Stephanie H.
  
 
947 
                                                
2008 TRADEMARK DECISIONS  
OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
DAVID M. KELLY
*
STEPHANIE H. BALD
**
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction.........................................................................................948 
 I. Substantive Trademark Issues...................................................950 
 A. Likelihood of Confusion....................................................950 
 1. Hainline v. Vanity Fair, Inc. ...........................................950 
 2. In re Marisol, LLC...........................................................952 
 B. Mere Descriptiveness..........................................................954 
 1. In re Centocor, Inc. ..........................................................954 
 C. Priority of Use.....................................................................956 
 1. First Niagara Insurance Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagara 
Financial Group, Inc. .....................................................956 
 II. Procedural Trademark Issues ...................................................961 
 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction ................................................961 
 1. Sakar International, Inc. v. United States .........................961 
 2. Siler v. United States ........................................................964 
 B. Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel, and Standing...............966 
 1. Nasalok Coating Corp. v. Nylok Corp. ..............................966 
 2. Farah v. Pramil S.R.L. ....................................................969 
Conclusion ...........................................................................................972 
 
 * David M. Kelly is a partner at Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & 
Dunner, and chairs the firm’s trademark and copyright practice. 
 **  Stephanie H. Bald is an associate at Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett 
& Dunner and an alumna of American University, Washington College of Law.  She 
thanks Dana M. Nicoletti, a current student associate at Finnegan and law student at 
American University, for her invaluable assistance in preparing this Article. 
  
948 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:947 
                                                
INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
issued eight trademark decisions1 and designated one of those eight 
decisions as precedential.2  These numbers are significantly lower 
than in recent years.3  The cases consist of appeals from the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”),4 the United States 
Court of International Trade,5 and the United States Court of Federal 
Claims.6
Of the eight trademark decisions, four focused on substantive 
issues7 and four primarily involved procedural issues.8  The Federal 
Circuit generally adopted the findings of the lower tribunals, 
affirming all but one of the eight decisions on appeal.9
The majority of the decisions were resolved based on longstanding 
precedent.10  A few of the cases, however, addressed issues of first 
 
 1. Hainline v. Vanity Fair, Inc., No. 2008-1313, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24558 
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 5, 2008) (per curiam); Farah v. Pramil S.R.L., No. 2008-1329, 2008 
U.S. App. LEXIS 24184 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 24, 2008) (per curiam); Siler v. United States, 
No. 2008-5054, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 21724 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 8, 2008) (per curiam), 
aff’g No. 08-099C, 2008 U.S. Claims LEXIS 337 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 6, 2008); First Niagara 
Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagara Fin. Group, Inc., 294 F. App’x 609 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(per curiam), aff’g Nos. 91122072, 91122224, 91122193, 91122450, 91122712, 
911502371 (T.T.A.B. June 6, 2007); In re Marisol, LLC, 281 F. App’x 999 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (per curiam); Nasalok Coating Corp. v. Nylok Corp., 522 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 
2008), aff’g No. 92045050, 2007 WL 1022715 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 28, 2007); Sakar Int’l, 
Inc. v. United States, 516 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 488 (2008); In 
re Centocor, Inc., 267 F. App’x 931 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 
 2. Sakar Int’l, Inc., 516 F.3d 1340. 
 3. By comparison, the Federal Circuit issued fifteen decisions in 2007 (eight of 
which were precedential), ten decisions in 2006 (seven of which were precedential), 
and twelve decisions in 2005 (six of which were precedential). See Stephen R. Baird, 
2005 Trademark Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1263 (2006); Christine 
Haight Farley, Review of the 2006 Trademark Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 56 AM. U. L. 
REV. 987 (2007); Susan M. Kayser & David Jaquette, 2007 Trademark Law Decisions of 
the Federal Circuit, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1039 (2008). 
 4. Hainline, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24558, at *1; Farah, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 
24184, at *1; First Niagara, 294 F. App’x at 610; In re Marisol, 281 F. App’x at 999; 
Nasalok Coating Corp., 522 F.3d at 1320; In re Centocor, 267 F. App’x at 931. 
 5. Sakar Int’l, Inc., 516 F.3d at 1340. 
 6. Siler, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 21724, at *1. 
 7. Hainline, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24558 (likelihood of confusion); First 
Niagara, 294 F. App’x 609 (priority and likelihood of confusion); In re Marisol, 281 F. 
App’x 999 (likelihood of confusion); In re Centocor, 267 F. App’x 931 (mere 
descriptiveness). 
 8. Farah, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24184, at *1–3 (standing and collateral 
estoppel); Siler, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 21724, at *1 (jurisdiction); Nasalok Coating 
Corp., 522 F.3d at 1322 (res judicata); Sakar Int’l, Inc., 516 F.3d at 1341–42 
(jurisdiction). 
 9. Sakar Int’l, Inc., 516 F.3d at 1341–42 (reversing the decision of the Court of 
International Trade). 
 10. See, e.g., Hainline, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24558, at *3–8 (applying the 
traditional In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. likelihood-of-confusion factors); In re 
Marisol, 281 F. App’x at 999 (same).   
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impression for the court.11  In Nasalok Coating Corp. v. Nylok Corp.,12 for 
example, the Federal Circuit held that a claim for cancellation of a 
trademark registration is not a compulsory counterclaim for a party 
defending an infringement action in federal court.13  Significantly, 
TTAB procedure provides that such a counterclaim is compulsory in 
TTAB proceedings under the same circumstances.14  Thus, whether a 
party has waived its right to challenge a trademark registration after 
failing to seek cancellation of that registration in a prior proceeding 
will turn on whether that proceeding was a federal court case or a 
proceeding before the TTAB.15
Also of note, in Sakar International, Inc. v. United States,16 the Federal 
Circuit reversed the Court of International Trade’s finding that it had 
jurisdiction to consider a party’s challenge to a fine issued by the 
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection for importing counterfeit 
products.17  The Federal Circuit found that the restrictions on 
importing counterfeit products did not rise to the level of an 
“embargo,” and thus the challenge to the fines was not within the 
limited jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade.18
Each of the Federal Circuit’s 2008 trademark decisions is discussed 
in detail below. 
 
 11. See, e.g., Nasalok Coating Corp., 522 F.3d 1320 (clarifying when a counterclaim 
is compulsory in actions for federal trademark infringement); Sakar Int’l, Inc., 516 
F.3d 1340 (clarifying that jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade does not 
extend to challenges to fines issued by the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection 
based on the importation of counterfeit goods). 
 12. 522 F.3d 1320. 
 13. Id. at 1326. 
 14. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 
MANUAL OF PROCEDURE (TMBP) § 313.01 (2003) (“‘A defense attacking the validity of 
any one or more of the registrations pleaded in the petition shall be a compulsory 
counterclaim if grounds for such counterclaim exist at the time when the answer is 
filed.’” (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 2.114(b)(2)(i))); see also Nasalok Coating Corp., 522 F.3d 
at 1325 n.3 (reminding that TTAB rules do not apply to infringement actions 
brought in federal district court). 
 15. Nasalok Coating Corp., 522 F.3d at 1325. 
 16. 516 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 488 (2008). 
 17. Id. at 1350. 
 18. Id. at 1346–48. 
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I. SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES 
A. Likelihood of Confusion 
1. Hainline v. Vanity Fair, Inc.19
In Hainline, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision 
sustaining the oppositions of Vanity Fair, Inc. (“Vanity Fair”), owner 
of several VANITY FAIR marks for clothing products, against Kelly C. 
Hainline’s applications for the marks VANITY N SANITY, VANITY & 
SANITY, and VANITY INSANITY (the “VANITY INSANITY marks”) 
for clothing products.20
Hainline sought registration of the VANITY INSANITY marks for a 
variety of clothing products, including lingerie, loungewear, 
sleepwear, and underwear.21  Vanity Fair alleged prior use and 
registration of several VANITY FAIR marks for similar clothing 
products and filed oppositions against each of Hainline’s applications 
on the ground of likelihood of confusion under section 2(d) of the 
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).22
In evaluating Vanity Fair’s claims, the TTAB applied the traditional 
likelihood-of-confusion factors set forth in In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours 
& Co.23  Regarding the fame of the prior mark, the fifth DuPont 
 
 19. No. 2008-1313, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24558 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 5, 2008) (per 
curiam). 
 20. Id. at *1–2. 
 21. Vanity Fair, Inc. v. Hainline (Hainline TTAB Decision), Nos. 91163354, 
91166973, 91166975, 2008 WL 853839, at *1 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 15, 2008), aff’d, No. 2008-
1313, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24558 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 5, 2008) (per curiam). 
 22. Id.  Vanity Fair also opposed the applications on the ground of dilution, but 
that claim was deemed waived because Vanity Fair did not brief the issue before the 
Board.  Id. at *1 n.4. 
 23. Id. at *3; see In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 
1973).  Under DuPont, the TTAB considers the following factors, among others, in 
determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion: 
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to 
appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  (2) The 
similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in 
an application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in 
use.  (3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade 
channels.  (4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are 
made, i.e. “impulse” vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.  (5) The fame of 
the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use).  (6) The number and 
nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.  (7) The nature and extent 
of any actual confusion.  (8) The length of time during and conditions 
under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual 
confusion.  (9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house 
mark, “family” mark, product mark).  (10) The market interface between 
applicant and the owner of a prior mark . . . . (11) The extent to which 
applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark on its goods.  
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factor, the TTAB found that the VANITY FAIR mark had achieved a 
significant degree of fame based on Vanity Fair’s use of the mark on 
clothing since 1916 and its substantial sales and advertising figures.24  
The TTAB also found that DuPont factors two, three, and four favored 
Vanity Fair because some of the parties’ goods were legally identical, 
the parties’ trade channels were presumed identical, and the parties’ 
goods were ordinary consumer goods purchased by ordinary 
consumers who would exercise only a normal degree of care in 
purchasing the goods.25  Additionally, the TTAB found that the 
parties’ marks were similar in overall connotation because VANITY 
was distinctive as to clothing and was thus the dominant element of 
the parties’ marks, and also VANITY was the first word in the parties’ 
marks.26
The TTAB found that factors six, seven, and eight were neutral.27  It 
explained that the strength of the VANITY FAIR mark was not 
mitigated by third-party use of similar marks for similar goods.28  
Specifically, although Hainline had submitted evidence of certain 
third-party registrations for the VANITY FAIR mark, these 
registrations did not constitute evidence of third-party use of the 
VANITY FAIR mark and none of the registrations covered the goods 
at issue (i.e., clothing).29  With respect to actual confusion, the TTAB 
noted that because Hainline’s applications were based on “intent-to-
use,” there was no evidence that she had made significant use of the 
VANITY INSANITY marks.30  And because there had not been an 
opportunity for actual confusion to occur, the lack of actual 
confusion was not probative.31
On balance, the TTAB found that the DuPont factors weighed in 
favor of a likelihood of confusion.32
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Hainline first argued that 
significant differences existed between the VANITY INSANITY marks 
and the VANITY FAIR mark because Hainline’s marks had “more 
visual presence and persistence” and were “more visually cutting edge 
 
(12) The extent of potential confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or 
substantial.  (13) Any other established fact probative of the effect of use. 
476 F.2d at 1361. 
 24. Hainline TTAB Decision, 2008 WL 853839 at *3. 
 25. Id. at *4. 
 26. See id. at *5.
 27. Id. at *4–5. 
 28. Id. at *4. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at *5. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at *6. 
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and progressive.”33  The Federal Circuit, however, agreed with the 
TTAB that the parties’ marks were similar in overall connotation 
because VANITY was the dominant feature of the parties’ marks and 
VANITY was distinctive and thus strong as applied to clothing.34
The Federal Circuit also rejected Hainline’s challenge to the 
TTAB’s determination that the VANITY FAIR mark was famous.35  
Hainline argued that Vanity Fair did not prove fame because it had 
not provided direct evidence of market share, surveys, or consumer 
recognition of the mark’s fame.36  The Federal Circuit explained that 
there was no requirement that Vanity Fair submit direct evidence of 
fame because the fame of a mark may be measured indirectly by the 
sales volume and advertising expenditures.  Here, Vanity Fair had 
provided this type of evidence.37
Finally, the Federal Circuit dismissed Hainline’s argument that the 
TTAB erred by not considering third-party registrations for the mark 
VANITY FAIR.38  The court explained that the TTAB had considered 
the third-party registrations, but the registrations did not cover 
clothing and  Hainline did not establish use of the marks covered by 
the third-party registrations.39  Therefore, the court explained, the 
third-party registrations were of minimal probative value.40
The Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision sustaining Vanity 
Fair’s oppositions to registration of Hainline’s VANITY INSANITY 
marks.41
2. In re Marisol, LLC42
In In re Marisol, the Federal Circuit affirmed, without opinion, the 
TTAB’s decision, affirming the examining attorney’s final refusal to 
register Marisol, LLC’s (“Applicant”) mark, DON THE 
BEACHCOMBER, as a trademark for “alcoholic beverages, namely, 
rum,” on the ground that the mark was confusingly similar to the 
previously registered BEACHCOMBER mark for “alcoholic 
beverages, namely, flavored rum.”43
 
 33. Hainline v. Vanity Fair, Inc., No. 2008-1313, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24558, at 
*8 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 5, 2008) (per curiam). 
 34. Id. at *9. 
 35. Id. at *10. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at *10–11. 
 39. Id. at *11. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. 281 F. App’x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam), aff’g No. 76600374, 2007 WL 
2698285 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 6, 2007). 
 43. Id. at 1000. 
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In weighing the DuPont likelihood-of-confusion factors,44 the TTAB 
first found that the factors of similarity of goods, trade channels and 
conditions of sale favored a finding of likelihood of confusion.45  The 
TTAB explained that the relevant goods were legally identical 
because Applicant’s goods (rum) encompassed Registrant’s goods 
(flavored rum).46  The TTAB also found that because the goods were 
the same, they were presumed to be sold in the same channels of 
trade to the same classes of customers.47  Further, the TTAB 
determined that some of those consumers would not be “particularly 
sophisticated or knowledgeable about rum.”48
Next, the TTAB found that two additional factors—fame and the 
extent of third-party use of the mark for similar goods—also weighed 
in favor of a likelihood of confusion.49  Although there was no 
evidence of fame of the BEACHCOMBER mark, the TTAB found 
that it was an arbitrary mark and was thus entitled to a broader scope 
of protection than if it were a highly suggestive mark.50  Additionally, 
the TTAB noted that there was no evidence of third-party use of 
BEACHCOMBER marks.51
Regarding the similarity of the parties’ marks, the TTAB rejected 
Applicant’s argument that either the term DON or DON THE was 
the dominant part of its DON THE BEACHCOMBER mark.52  Rather, 
the TTAB found that the term DON was not “entitled to greater 
weight than BEACHCOMBER, since THE BEACHCOMBER [was] so 
intrinsically related to DON as an identifier of who DON is.”53  The 
TTAB also disagreed with the examining attorney’s position that 
BEACHCOMBER was the dominant part of Applicant’s mark.54  The 
TTAB reasoned that the impression created by Applicant’s mark was 
the phrase DON THE BEACHCOMBER and, thus, both the name 
DON and the word BEACHCOMBER had to be given weight.55
Applying this analysis, the TTAB held that the similarities far 
outweighed the dissimilarities between the marks.56  The TTAB 
 
 44. See supra note 23 (listing the DuPont factors). 
 45. In re Marisol, LLC (Marisol TTAB Decision), No. 76600374, 2007 WL 2698285 
(T.T.A.B. Feb. 6, 2007), aff’d, 281 F. App’x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 46. Id. at *2. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at *2–3. 
 49. Id. at *3. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at *5–13. 
 53. Id. at *13. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at *17. 
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explained that the word BEACHCOMBER was identical in both 
marks, BEACHCOMBER was an arbitrary term for rum, there was no 
evidence of third-party registrations or third-party use of the marks 
comprising of or containing the BEACHCOMBER term, and 
Applicant’s DON THE BEACHCOMBER mark did not convey a 
significantly different meaning or commercial impression than 
Registrant’s BEACHCOMBER mark.57   
On balance, the TTAB found that there was a likelihood of 
confusion between the marks and affirmed the decision of the 
examining attorney.58  The Federal Circuit, in turn, affirmed the 
decision of the TTAB.59
B. Mere Descriptiveness 
1. In re Centocor, Inc.60
In In re Centocor, the Federal Circuit affirmed, without opinion, the 
TTAB’s decision that Centocor, Inc.’s mark, PROGRAMMED 
PROTEIN, was merely descriptive of its medical research services 
relating to DNA and gene synthesis and was thus barred from 
registration under section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.  
§ 1052(e)(1).61
Centocor filed an application to register PROGRAMMED 
PROTEIN for “medical research services relating to DNA and gene 
synthesis.”62  The examining attorney refused registration under 
section 2(e)(1) on the ground that Applicant’s mark was merely 
descriptive of its services.63
On appeal to the TTAB, the examining attorney relied on the 
following dictionary definition for the word “programmed” in 
support of her decision:  “3.(c)(1) to code in an organism’s program 
(2) to provide with a biological program, <cells programmed to 
synthesize hemoglobin>; 4. to predetermine the thinking, behavior, 
or operations of as if by computer programming.”64  The examining 
 
 57. Id. at *7. 
 58. Id. at *21–22. 
 59. In re Marisol, LLC, 281 F. App’x 999, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam), aff’g 
No. 76600374, 2007 WL 2698285 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 6, 2007). 
 60. 267 F. App’x 931 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam), aff’g No. 78448489, 2006 WL 
3540106, at *1 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 9, 2006). 
 61. Id. at 932. 
 62. In re Centocor, Inc. (Centocor TTAB Decision), No. 78448489, 2006 WL 
3540106, at *1 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 29, 2006), aff’d, 267 F. App’x 931 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 63. Id. at *1. 
 64. Id. at *2 (quoting Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/programmed (last visited Jan. 31, 2009)). 
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attorney also submitted printouts from websites, as well as  excerpted 
articles from various publications, where the phrase “programmed 
protein” or the words “programmed” and “protein” were used by 
third parties in medical contexts.65
Among other evidence, Centocor submitted a business plan 
describing its anticipated services under the PROGRAMMED 
PROTEIN mark, a hit list of excerpted articles from the GOOGLE 
search engine, and search results from the websites of the “Top 10 
Pharmaceutical companies” and from the “On-Line Medical 
Dictionary.”66  In addition, Centocor submitted the following 
dictionary definition regarding the word “protein”:  “1. any of 
numerous naturally occurring extremely complex substances that 
consist of amino acid residues joined by peptide bonds, contain the 
elements carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, usually sulfur, and 
occasionally other elements . . . and include many essential biological 
compounds.”67
Based on a review of Centocor’s business plan, the TTAB noted 
that Centocor’s services would involve the design and development of 
protein pharmaceuticals and that the proteins were produced “by 
programming the sequence into the synthetic DNA and expressing it 
in host cells.”68  Accordingly, the TTAB found that “protein” was 
descriptive of Centocor’s services because it was the resulting product 
of the services, and that “programmed” was similarly descriptive 
because it was the means by which the services create the product.69  
Additionally, the TTAB found that these terms together did not 
create a “unique or incongruous combination.”70  Rather, the TTAB 
concluded that, when combined, these terms did not lose their 
descriptive significance but, in fact, made clear that Centocor 
intended to produce programmed protein.71
In finding the PROGRAMMED PROTEIN mark descriptive of 
Centocor’s services, the TTAB explained that the mere fact that 
Centocor was the first and only user of the specific combination 
PROGRAMMED PROTEIN “did not support registration if the only 
significance conveyed by the phrase is merely descriptive.”72  The 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at *3. 
 67. Id. (quoting Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/protein (last visited Jan. 31, 2009)). 
 68. Id. at *4. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. (emphasis added). 
 72. Id. 
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TTAB also rejected Centocor’s argument that because the 
PROGRAMMED PROTEIN mark did not create one single, 
immediately understood meaning of the mark, it was not merely 
descriptive.73  The TTAB explained that it must look at the mark as 
used in connection with Centocor’s identified medical services 
relating to DNA and gene synthesis.74  The TTAB held that “[t]he fact 
that a term may have meanings other than the one relevant to the 
services in issue here is not controlling.”75  In this case, the TTAB 
concluded that it was sufficient that a purpose or feature of 
Centocor’s services was included within the meaning of the term.76
In sum, considering PROGRAMMED PROTEIN as a whole, the 
TTAB found that the evidence of record established a prima facie 
case that the mark was descriptive, and that the mark “immediately 
describe[d] . . . a significant feature or function of [Centocor’s] 
services, namely the provision of programmed proteins.”77  
Accordingly, the TTAB affirmed the examining attorney’s refusal to 
register the mark under section 2(e)(1),78 and, in turn, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision.79
C. Priority of Use 
1. First Niagara Insurance Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagara Financial 
 Group, Inc.80
In First Niagara, the Federal Circuit affirmed, without opinion, the 
TTAB’s decision dismissing certain opposition proceedings and 
sustaining others filed by First National Insurance Brokers, Inc. (“FN-
Canada”) against First Niagara Financial Group, Inc. (“FN-US”) based 
on FN-US’s applications to register several marks incorporating 
FIRST NATIONAL for insurance, leasing, and banking services.81  
The Federal Circuit had reversed an earlier TTAB decision in this 
case on the ground that the “use” required to challenge an 
application for registration on the grounds of priority and likelihood 
 
 73. Id. at *5. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at *6. 
 78. Id. at *7. 
 79. In re Centocor, Inc., 267 F. App’x 931, 932 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam), aff’g 
No. 78448489, 2006 WL 3540106, at *1 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 9, 2006). 
 80. First Niagara Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagara Fin. Group, Inc. (Niagara II), 
294 F. App’x 609 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam), aff’g Nos. 91122072, 91122224, 
91122193, 91122450, 91122712, 911502371 (T.T.A.B. June 6, 2007). 
 81. Id. at 610. 
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of confusion was merely “use in the United States,” not “use in 
commerce.”82  Because the TTAB had mistakenly applied the higher 
standard of “use in commerce,” the Federal Circuit remanded the 
case to the TTAB.83
FN-US, a U.S.-based insurance brokerage firm, filed intent-to-use 
applications for a number of marks encompassing the term FIRST 
NIAGARA for various leasing, banking, insurance, and financial 
services.84
 
 FN-Canada, a Canada-based insurance broker, opposed 
each of FN-US’s applications on the basis that FN-US’s marks were 
likely to cause confusion with FN-Canada’s prior unregistered (i.e., 
common law) marks, including the marks FIRST NIAGARA and 
FIRST NIAGARA INSURANCE BROKERS for insurance and 
financial services.85
FN-Canada did not have any offices, employees, or assets in the 
United States, and it was not licensed to act as an insurance broker in 
the United States.86  It did, however, sell insurance policies issued by 
United States-based underwriting companies, and it sold policies to 
United States citizens with Canadian property through insurance 
brokers in the United States.87  Additionally, FN-Canada used its 
FIRST NIAGARA marks in advertising that spilled over into the 
United States and in correspondence to customers in the United 
States.88
When the TTAB first heard this case on October 21, 2005, FN-US 
argued that FN-Canada could not establish the priority needed to 
prevail on a likelihood-of-confusion claim because it had not used its 
marks “in commerce” in the United States under 15 U.S.C. § 1127.89  
The TTAB agreed, finding that any connections FN-Canada had with 
the United States were de minimis and “merely incidental to FN-
Canada’s rendering of its insurance brokerage services in Canada.”90  
The TTAB further held that FN-Canada’s activities did not constitute 
 
 82. First Niagara Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagara Fin. Group, Inc. (Niagara I), 
476 F.3d 867, 871 (Fed. Cir. 2007), rev’g Nos. 91122072, 91122224, 91122193, 
91122450, 91122712, 91150237, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1334 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 21, 2005). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 868–69. 
 85. Id. at 869. 
 86. Id. at 868. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 869. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 869–70 (quoting First Niagara Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagara Fin. 
Group, Inc. (Niagara TTAB Decision I), Nos. 91122072, 91122224, 91122193, 
91122450, 91122712, 91150237, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d 1334, 1344 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 21, 2005)). 
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rendering of insurance brokerage services in either interstate or 
foreign commerce.91
The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the TTAB erroneously 
framed the issue as “use in commerce” regulated by Congress, as 
opposed to “use in the United States.”92  The court held that such an 
assumption was unwarranted due to the plain language of the statute, 
which requires only that the prior mark be “used in the United States 
by another.”93  According to the Federal Circuit, the privilege to claim 
priority under section 2(d), based only on intrastate use of a mark, 
“attaches to all opposers, regardless of whether they are foreign or 
domestic.”94  Accordingly, a foreign opposer like FN-Canada is 
entitled to oppose a mark merely by demonstrating use of its mark in 
the United States.95
 
 Applying this test, the Federal Circuit held that 
the TTAB erroneously dismissed FN-Canada’s oppositions as the 
record revealed “more than ample” use of FN-Canada’s marks in the 
United States to satisfy the use requirements of section 2(d).  The 
Federal Circuit remanded the case to the TTAB for further 
proceedings consistent with its opinion.96
On remand, based on the Federal Circuit’s decision, the TTAB 
found that FN-Canada had established priority of use for each of its 
pleaded FIRST NIAGARA marks used in connection with insurance 
services.97  The TTAB then turned to the issue of likelihood of 
confusion, applying the following DuPont factors:98  (1) similarity of 
the marks, (2) similarity of the services, (3) actual confusion,  
(4) intent, (5) trade channels, (6) classes of purchasers, and 
(7) conditions under which purchases are made.99  Regarding the 
similarity of the marks, the TTAB found that FIRST NIAGARA was 
the dominant portion of each of the parties’ marks, that each of the 
parties’ marks began with the term FIRST NIAGARA, and that the 
other wording in each of the parties’ marks was merely descriptive, if 
not generic, and had been disclaimed.100  Based on these and other 
 
 91. Id. at 870 (quoting Niagara TTAB Decision I, Nos. 91122072, 91122224, 
91122193, 91122450, 91122712, 91150237,,77 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1344). 
 92. Id. at 871. 
 93. Id. at 870 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2006)). 
 94. Id. at 871. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. First Niagara Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagara Fin. Group, Inc. (Niagara 
TTAB Decision II), Nos. 91122072, 91122224, 91122193, 91122450, 91122712, 
911502371, slip op. at 9–10 (T.T.A.B. June 6, 2007), aff’d, 294 F. App’x 609 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 98. See supra note 23 (listing the DuPont factors). 
 99. Niagara TTAB Decision II, slip op. at 11–28. 
 100. Id. at 12–13. 
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facts, the TTAB found that the similarities of the parties’ marks 
weighed strongly in FN-Canada’s favor.101
Regarding the parties’ services, the TTAB first considered the three 
applications owned by FN-Canada covering services in Class 36 and 
various leasing services in other classes.102  Finding that the parties’ 
insurance-related services were identical, the TTAB concluded that 
the similarity-of-goods factor weighed strongly in FN-Canada’s favor 
in relation to the insurance services covered by these applications.103  
However, the TTAB also found that there was no evidence of record 
that FN-Canada offered the leasing services covered by those three 
applications or that the leasing services were sufficiently related to its 
insurance services to cause a likelihood of confusion.104  Accordingly, 
the TTAB held that the similarity-of-goods factor weighed in favor of 
FN-US for the leasing and related services in Classes 35, 37, and 39 in 
those three applications.105
Turning to the remaining three applications, which covered only 
banking services in Class 36, the TTAB rejected FN-Canada’s 
argument that such services were related to its insurance services, 
finding that there was insufficient evidence of record to establish a 
connection between FN-Canada’s insurance services and either FN-
US’s retail banking services or its electronic banking services.106  
Accordingly, the TTAB found that the similarity-of-goods factor 
weighed in FN-US’s favor for banking services.107
FN-Canada contended that the record contained significant 
evidence of actual confusion noting that from July 2000 to July 2002 
FN-Canada received 2600 emails intended for FN-US.108  FN-US 
admitted that its clients had mistakenly sent emails to FN-Canada.  
However, FN-US argued that the misdirected emails were the result 
of similarities in the parties’ email addresses, as opposed to any 
confusion as to the source of the parties’ insurance services.109  The 
TTAB held that, because the parties were relatively small local 
businesses, the number of misdirected emails was significant.  This 
problem, however, had occurred during a two-year period 
commencing shortly after FN-Canada implemented its new email 
 
 101. Id. at 16. 
 102. Id. at 17–18. 
 103. Id. at 18. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 18–23. 
 107. Id. at 23. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. at 23–24 (noting that FN-Canada’s domain name was 
“firstniagara.com” and FN-US’s domain name was “first-niagara.com”). 
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system using the “firstniagara.com” domain name, and thus at least 
some of the errors were likely the result of a typing error.110  Further, 
the TTAB found that the likelihood of more than initial-interest 
confusion was extremely limited because FN-Canada was not licensed 
to provide insurance services in the United States and FN-US was not 
licensed to provide insurance services in Canada.111  Accordingly, 
although the TTAB found that the actual confusion shown in the 
record favored FN-Canada, the mitigating factors involved made this 
factor of little probative value.112
As to intent, FN-Canada argued that the similarities in the marks 
and the geographic proximity of the parties’ businesses to each other 
established FN-US intended to trade on FN-Canada’s goodwill.113  
However, the TTAB found that there was no evidence of such intent, 
and it refused to infer such intent “from the mere facts of both 
businesses using marks strongly suggestive of their respective 
geographic locations.”114
Finally, the TTAB presumed that the insurance services offered by 
the parties were rendered through the same channels of trade.115  
However, with respect to FN-US’s banking and leasing services, there 
was no evidence in the record of the channels of trade, and thus the 
TTAB drew no conclusions in this regard.116  As to the classes of 
customers, the TTAB found that there was no evidence in the record 
that the relevant public was more limited than the general public, 
and thus this factor weighed in favor of a likelihood of confusion.117  
However, because the TTAB found that insurance, leasing, and 
banking services were likely to involve some degree of care due to 
their relative expense, the care likely used in purchasing such services 
mitigated against a likelihood of confusion.118
Based on the analysis above, the TTAB concluded that because of 
the substantial similarities between the commercial impressions of 
the parties’ FIRST NIAGARA marks, their concurrent use of the 
identical marks on the identical insurance services in the same trade 
channels and to the same classes of purchasers, a likelihood of 
confusion existed as to insurance services.119  On the other hand, the 
 
 110. Id. at 25–26. 
 111. Id. at 26. 
 112. Id. at 27. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 27–28. 
 116. Id. at 28. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 29. 
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TTAB also concluded that despite the substantial similarities in the 
commercial impressions of the parties’ marks, FN-Canada had not 
established that its insurance services were sufficiently related to FN-
US’s leasing and/or banking services to create a likelihood of 
confusion as to those particular services.120  Thus, the TTAB sustained 
FN-Canada’s oppositions to the three applications covering insurance 
and leasing services as to the services in Class 36 (i.e., the insurance 
services), but dismissed the oppositions as to the remaining 
services.121  Further, the TTAB dismissed the oppositions to the three 
applications covering only banking services.122  The Federal Circuit 
affirmed the TTAB’s decision in its entirety.123
II. PROCEDURAL TRADEMARK ISSUES 
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
1. Sakar International, Inc. v. United States124
In Sakar International, Inc., the Federal Circuit reversed the decision 
of the United States Court of International Trade, which had held 
that it had jurisdiction over Sakar International, Inc.’s (“Sakar”) 
challenge to a fine imposed by the Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection (“Customs”) for importing counterfeit products into the 
United States.125  The Federal Circuit determined that Sakar’s 
challenge did not fall within the limited jurisdiction of the Court of 
International Trade.126
In 2002, Sakar attempted to import into the United States 500 
personal digital assistant (“PDA”) travel chargers and 2311 PDA mini-
keyboards that had been manufactured in China.127  Customs 
determined that the goods were counterfeit because the travel 
chargers bore the “UL” trademark registered to Underwriters 
Laboratories and the mini-keyboards displayed the “Flying Window” 
trademark of Microsoft Corporation.128  Customs seized the goods 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 30. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Niagara II, 294 F. App’x 609, 610 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam), aff’g Nos. 
91122072, 91122224, 91122193, 91122450, 91122712, 911502371 (T.T.A.B. June 6, 
2007). 
 124. 516 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008), rev’g 466 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
2006), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 488 (2008). 
 125. Id. at 1341–42. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 1342. 
 128. Id. 
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pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C.  
§ 1526(e),129 which provided that “any . . . merchandise bearing a 
counterfeit mark . . . imported into the United States . . . shall be 
seized and, in the absence of the written consent of the trademark 
owner, forfeited for violations of the customs laws.”130  In a letter, 
Customs notified Sakar of the seizure and informed Sakar that the 
goods would be forfeited and disposed of, unless the trademark 
owners consented in writing to the importation within thirty days.131  
The goods were destroyed because Customs did not receive the 
requisite consents.132
Customs used its discretion under 19 U.S.C. § 1526(f) to fine Sakar 
$381,500, a fine that was double the amount Customs evaluated to be 
the goods’ manufacturer’s suggested retail price (“MSRP”).133  
Responding to a petition by Sakar, Customs reduced the fine by fifty 
percent to $190,750, and later further reduced the fine to $67,775 
based on a recalculation of the MSRP.134  Customs notified Sakar of 
this reduction in a letter, which stated that “the letter constituted the 
‘final administrative review’ available to Sakar” and that Customs 
would accept no further petitions.135
Sakar filed suit in the Court of International Trade, alleging in its 
complaint that Customs had acted contrary to law in its calculation of 
the MSRP of the seized goods and in its conclusion that the goods 
were counterfeit.136  Sakar’s complaint alleged that jurisdiction was 
proper based on several provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1581.137  The court 
found proper jurisdiction only under § 1581(i)(4) as it relates to  
§ 1581(i)(3).138  As the court noted, § 1581(i)(3) provided in relevant 
part: 
 [T]he Court of International Trade shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against the United 
States, its agencies, or its officers, that arises out of any law of the 
United States providing for . . . (3) embargoes or other quantitative 
restrictions on the importation of merchandise for reasons other 
than the protection of the public health or safety; or (4) 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e) (2006). 
 131. Sakar Int’l, Inc., 516 F.3d at 1342. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 1342–43. 
 135. Id. at 1343. 
 136. Id. (citing Sakar Int’l, Inc. v. United States (Sakar USCIT Decision), 466 F. 
Supp. 2d 1333, 1336–37 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006), rev’d, 516 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008), 
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 488 (2008)).
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. (citing Sakar USCIT Decision, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1337–46).
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administration and enforcement with respect to the matters 
referred to in paragraphs (1)–(3) of this subsection . . . .139
The Court of International Trade determined that Custom’s 
seizure of Sakar’s goods amounted to an “embargo” within the 
meaning of § 1581(i)(3) and thus held that jurisdiction was proper.140
On appeal, the Federal Circuit looked to the Supreme Court’s 
holding in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.141 as it related to the 
jurisdictional question at issue.142  The Federal Circuit noted that, in 
that case, the Supreme Court held that the word ‘embargo’ should be 
interpreted based upon its ordinary meaning, which is “a 
governmentally imposed [quantitative] restriction—of zero—on the 
importation of merchandise.”143  The Federal Circuit further noted 
the Supreme Court’s explanation that 
[a]n importation prohibition is not an embargo if rather than 
reflecting a governmental restriction on the quantity of a particular 
product that will enter, it merely provides a mechanism by which a 
private party might, at its own option, enlist the Government’s aid 
in restricting the quantity of imports in order to enforce a private 
right.144
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit noted the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning that 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a)—the statute at issue in that case—
is very different from an embargo because “[t]he trademark owner 
has the sole authority to decide that all products bearing its 
trademark will enter or that none will, and to decide what entity may 
import them, under what conditions, and for what purpose.”145
In Sakar, the government argued that the holding in K Mart 
regarding 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) applied with equal force to 19 U.S.C.  
§ 1526(e) because a seizure of goods under § 1526(e) is not an 
 
 139. Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3) (2000)). 
 140. Sakar Int’l, Inc., 516 F.3d at 1343.  The Court of International Trade also 
considered whether, under court Rule 12(b)(5), Sakar International’s complaint 
stated a claim on which relief could be granted.  Id. at 1343–44; see also CT. INT’L 
TRADE R. 12(b)(5) (permitting a party to assert by motion the defense of “failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted”).  Because the Federal Circuit did 
not reach this issue on appeal, however, we do not address it in this Article. 
 141. 485 U.S. 176 (1988). 
 142. Sakar Int’l, Inc., 516 F.3d at 1345. 
 143. Id. (quoting K Mart, 485 U.S. at 185). 
 144. Id. (quoting K Mart, 485 U.S. at 185). 
 145. Id. (quoting K Mart, 485 U.S. at 186); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (2006) 
(“[I]t shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of foreign 
manufacture if such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package, wrapper, or 
receptacle, bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation . . . 
organized within, the United States, and registered in the Patent and Trademark 
Office . . . unless written consent of the owner of such trademark is produced at the 
time of making entry.”).  
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embargo because it is not a governmentally imposed quantitative 
restriction on the importation of merchandise.146  In response, Sakar 
argued that § 1526(e) completely bans the importation of counterfeit 
goods and thus was, in fact, an embargo.147
The Federal Circuit sided with the government because, under 
§ 1526(e), the trademark owner possesses the ultimate control over 
whether counterfeit merchandise is imported.148  Specifically, the 
court explained that § 1526(e) sets forth a two-step process in which 
(1) Customs seizes illegally imported counterfeit merchandise, and 
(2) Customs forfeits that merchandise, unless the trademark owner 
consents to the importation.149  Thus, because the counterfeit 
merchandise may enter the United States with the consent of the 
trademark owner, the court found that § 1526(e) does not constitute 
an embargo under K Mart.150
As such, the Federal Circuit held that the Court of International 
Trade lacked jurisdiction over Sakar’s suit and vacated and remanded 
the decision with the instruction that the Court of International 
Trade dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.151
2. Siler v. United States152
In Siler, the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the United 
States Court of Federal Claims, finding, among other things, that the 
Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction to hear trademark 
disputes.153
Stanley R. Siler had filed an action in the Court of Federal Claims 
alleging that the United States, through the U.S. courts, had 
“damaged” his copyright and trademark (1) “by breach of duty, 
breach of trust, with fraudulent intent, done through negligence,” 
and (2) “by engaging in unfair trade practices and unfair 
competition.”154  More precisely, Siler claimed that, in prior legal 
actions, “various state and federal courts did not rule on his motions, 
did not give him an opportunity to appear and/or be heard, and that 
 
 146. Sakar Int’l, Inc., 516 F.3d at 1345. 
 147. Id. at 1345–46. 
 148. Id. at 1347 (emphasis added). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 1348. 
 151. Id. at 1350. 
 152. Siler v. United States, No. 2008-5054, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 21724 (Fed. Cir. 
Oct. 8, 2008) (per curiam), aff’g No. 08-099C, 2008 U.S. Claims LEXIS 337 (Fed. Cl. 
Mar. 6, 2008). 
 153. Id. at *1. 
 154. Id. 
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the government seized his property and had him arrested.”155  In 
response to Siler’s claims, the Court of Federal Claims dismissed the 
complaint for lack of jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.156  
Additionally, the Court of Federal Claims determined that any 
allegations that the government had infringed Siler’s copyright or 
trademark under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b)157 failed to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted.158  As a result, the complaint was 
subject to dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) of the Civil Rules of Federal 
Procedure.159
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the Court of Federal 
Claims’ dismissal of Siler’s complaint was proper.160  First, the Federal 
Circuit found that Siler’s allegations about the actions and rulings of 
various courts were not within the jurisdictional grant of § 
1491(a)(1).161  In short, the Court of Federal Claims had no authority 
to review the decisions of the courts in which Siler had previously 
filed complaints.162  Rather, Siler should have sought review of the 
other courts’ decisions through the appellate process of each such 
court.163  Second, the Federal Circuit found that the lower court did 
not err by noting that a trademark infringement claim was subject to 
dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.164  This was because no statute grants the Court of Federal 
Claims jurisdiction over trademark claims.165
The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the Court of Federal 
Claims to dismiss the action.166
 
 155. Id. at *1–2. 
 156. Id. at *2; see Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006) (granting jurisdiction 
to the Court of Federal Claims to render judgment upon various claims against the 
United States). 
 157. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (2006) (“[W]henever the copyright in any work 
protected under the copyright laws of the United States shall be infringed by the 
United States . . . the exclusive action which may be brought for such infringement 
shall be an action by the copyright owner against the United States in the Court of 
Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation as 
damages for such infringement . . . .”). 
 158. Siler, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 21724, at *2. 
 159. Id.; see also CT. FED. CL. R. 12(b)(6) (listing “failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted” as a valid defense by motion).  Due to the limited scope 
of this Article, the copyright-related holding of this case is not discussed. 
 160. Siler, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 21724, at *2. 
 161. Id. at *3. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at *4. 
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B. Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel, and Standing 
1. Nasalok Coating Corp. v. Nylok Corp.167
In Nasalok, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s summary 
judgment grant in favor of Nylok Corp. (“Nylok”) and held that 
Nasalok Coating Corp.’s (“Nasalok”) claims were barred by res 
judicata (claim preclusion).168
Both parties manufactured “self-locking fasteners using nylon 
locking elements.”169  Nasalok, a Korean corporation, sold products to 
multiple U.S.-based companies.170  Nylok, a U.S. corporation, owned 
federal trademark Registration No. 2,398,840 (“the ‘840 
Registration”) for “a patch of the color blue on a selected number of 
threads of an externally threaded fastener, with the blue patch 
extending more than 90 degrees and less than 360 degrees around 
the circumference of the fastener.”171  The designated use for the 
mark was on “metal externally threaded fasteners.”172  The design 
mark appears below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Initially, Nylok filed a complaint against Nasalok in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and alleged 
infringement of several trademarks, one of which was the ‘840 
Registration.173  Due to Nasalok’s failure to enter an appearance in 
district court, the district court entered a default judgment and an 
injunction against Nasalok that prohibited the company from selling, 
importing, and promoting or advertising any self-locking fastener 
with a nylon locking element having the color blue or any confusingly 
 
 167. Nasalok Coating Corp. v. Nylok Corp., 522 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’g 
No. 92045050, 2007 WL 1022715 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 28, 2007). 
 168. Id. at 1330. 
 169. Id. at 1322. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
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similar color.174  The order also stated that Nylok was the owner of the 
‘840 Registration and that the trademark was valid and enforceable.175  
Nasalok did not appeal that order.176
After five months passed, Nasalok petitioned the TTAB,177 alleging 
that 
the [‘840 Registration] [was] invalid because it [was] functional, a 
phantom mark, descriptive, generic, not distinctive, and 
ornamental; that Nylok’s use ha[d] not been substantially 
exclusive; and that Nylok fraudulently obtained the ’840 
Registration by stating in its amended application that the mark 
had become distinctive of [its] goods through substantially 
exclusive and continuous use in interstate commerce for five 
years.178
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Nylok argued that 
res judicata barred Nasalok from claiming that the ‘840 Registration 
was invalid because Nasalok had not asserted an invalidity claim in 
the earlier infringement action.179  The TTAB granted Nylok’s 
motion, holding that res judicata barred Nasalok’s petition to cancel 
because (1) the infringement action and the petition involved the 
same parties, (2) a final judgment on the merits had been made on 
the infringement action, and (3) the cancellation petition arose out 
of the same transactional facts as those present in the civil action.180
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first determined that Nasalok’s 
claim of trademark invalidity was not a compulsory counterclaim in 
the trademark infringement action in the district court.  The court 
reasoned that the subject matter of Nylok’s infringement claim in the 
first action and the subject matter of Nasalok’s invalidity claim in the 
second action did not arise out of the same “transaction or 
occurrence.”181  Specifically, the “essential facts” that Nylok alleged in 
its infringement action—its ownership of the mark and Nasalok’s 
alleged infringement—did not form the basis of Nasalok’s 
cancellation claim.182  In addition, the Federal Circuit cited various 
policy reasons for the position that invalidity defenses should not be 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id.; Nasalok Coating Corp. v. Nylok Corp. (Nasalok TTAB Decision), No. 
92045050, 2007 WL 1022715, at *1 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 28, 2007), aff’d, 522 F.3d 1320 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 178. Nasalok Coating Corp., 522 F.3d at 1322. 
 179. Id. at 1322–23. 
 180. Id. at 1323 (citing Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 223 F.3d 1360, 1362 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (establishing a three-part test for claim preclusion)). 
 181. Id. at 1325–26 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)(1)(A)). 
 182. Id. at 1326. 
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treated as compulsory counterclaims.183  For example, the Federal 
Circuit noted that it may be “difficult to anticipate . . . new products 
and future disputes that may later arise between . . . two parties . . . . 
[so] a defendant in [a] first infringement suit should not be 
precluded from raising invalidity of the mark in the second action 
simply because it was not raised as a counterclaim in the first 
action.”184  The court noted further that “treating challenges to 
trademark validity as compulsory counterclaims to infringement 
actions would violate the well-established policy of freely allowing 
challenges to the validity of claimed intellectual property 
protection.”185  In holding that a claim for cancellation of a trademark 
registration was not a compulsory counterclaim for a party defending 
against an infringement action in district court, the Federal Circuit 
acknowledged its departure from TTAB precedent and procedure, 
which provides that such a counterclaim is compulsory in TTAB 
proceedings under the same circumstances.186
Second, the Federal Circuit determined that the later action 
collaterally attacked the judgment of the first action.187  The court 
observed that allowing Nasalok to challenge the validity of the ‘840 
Registration, which granted Nylok the rights to use “a patch of color 
blue on a selected number of threads of an externally threaded 
fastener,” would effectively undo the district court’s injunction order 
in the infringement action.188  Claim preclusion was thus necessary to 
protect the earlier judgment.189  The court rejected Nasalok’s 
argument that preclusion should not apply to an injunction resulting 
from a default judgment, stating that “[i]t is well established that ‘[a] 
default judgment can operate as res judicata in appropriate 
circumstances.’”190  Because the trademark invalidity claim constituted 
a collateral attack on the district court’s judgment in the earlier suit, 
the Federal Circuit held that res judicata barred Nasalok’s claim and 
affirmed the TTAB’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Nylok.191
 
 183. Id. at 1327. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id.; see also Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 (1969) (repudiating the 
rule of patent licensee estoppel, under which a licensee is prohibited from 
challenging the validity of the patent that is the basis for the license because of “the 
strong federal policy favoring the full and free use of ideas in the public domain”). 
 186. Nasalok Coating Corp., 522 F.3d at 1325 n.3; see also supra note 14 (discussing 
TTAB rules regarding compulsory counterclaims). 
 187. Id. at 1328–29. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 1329. 
 190. Id. (quoting Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha v. Thinksharp, 448 F.3d 1368, 1371 
(Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
 191. Id. at 1330. 
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Circuit Judge Newman concurred in the judgment, stating that 
while she agreed with the majority’s affirmation of the TTAB’s 
judgment, she would do so because “Nasalok’s claim for cancellation 
[was] precluded by the judgment against Nasalok” in the district 
court.192  She asserted that the question of whether Nasalok’s 
trademark invalidity claim was a compulsory counterclaim was 
irrelevant193 because “the TTAB recognized [that] the cancellation 
proceeding raise[d] the same grounds of invalidity that were before 
the district court.”194  Thus, Judge Newman reasoned that the validity 
of the mark “was decided and was not appealed.”195  Judge Newman 
contended that the majority’s thorough discussion of compulsory 
counterclaims was irrelevant and that precedent did not broadly 
authorize relitigation in the PTO issues that were  decided finally in 
the district court between the same parties.196  Judge Newman also 
criticized the majority opinion’s reliance on patent public policy, 
explaining that patent and trademark public policy did not share the 
same objectives.197  In sum, Judge Newman agreed that Nasalok’s 
petition to cancel should be dismissed, but determined that it should 
be dismissed on the ground of basic claim preclusion.198
2. Farah v. Pramil S.R.L.199
In Farah, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s cancellation of 
Michel Farah’s trademark registration based on Pramil S.R.L.’s 
(“Pramil”) prior registration for the same mark.200  It also rejected 
Farah’s arguments that Pramil lacked standing, that it was collaterally 
estopped from asserting the grounds for cancellation, and that it 
failed to carry its burden of proof for priority of use and continuous 
use of the mark during the cancellation proceeding.201
Farah applied to register, in connection with certain cosmetics, the 
mark OMIC PLUS.202  Pramil petitioned to cancel the registration, 
alleging priority of use for the mark OMIC for cosmetics and that a 
likelihood of confusion existed between the OMIC mark and Farah’s 
 
 192. Id. (Newman, C.J., concurring). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 1331. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Farah v. Pramil S.R.L., No. 2008-1329, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24184 (Fed. Cir. 
Nov. 24, 2008) (per curiam). 
 200. Id. at *1. 
 201. Id. at *4–11. 
 202. Id. at *1. 
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OMIC PLUS mark.203  While the TTAB case was pending, Farah’s 
exclusive licensee— Gapardis Health and Beauty, Inc. (“Gapardis”)—
filed an infringement action against Pramil and Pramil’s U.S. 
distributor in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida.204  Pramil did not respond to the complaint, and a 
default judgment was entered for Gapardis, permanently enjoining 
Pramil from using the mark OMIC PLUS.205  Farah moved for 
summary judgment before the TTAB, alleging that the district court’s 
injunction had eliminated Pramil’s standing and that Pramil was 
collaterally estopped from asserting the grounds for cancellation.206  
The TTAB denied Farah’s motion, and, after finding that Pramil had 
established priority of use and likelihood of confusion, subsequently 
granted the cancellation of Farah’s registration.207  Farah appealed, 
arguing (1) that the district court’s judgment barred Pramil from 
maintaining its cancellation petition because it lacked standing after 
the permanent injunction and (2) the district court’s default 
judgment collaterally estopped Pramil from asserting the cancellation 
claim.208  Additionally, Farah argued that Pramil failed to meet its 
burden of proof in its cancellation proceeding for both priority of 
use and continuous use of its mark.209
The Federal Circuit first rejected Farah’s argument that Pramil 
lacked standing in the cancellation proceeding after the district 
court’s judgment.210  Under 15 U.S.C. § 1064, a petition to cancel a 
registration of a mark may be filed “by any person who believes that 
he is or will be damaged . . . by the registration of a mark.”211  Under 
this standard, Pramil needed only to demonstrate a “real interest” in 
the proceedings and a reasonable basis for the belief of damage.212  
When the TTAB applied this standard, it found that Pramil’s use of 
the OMIC mark for cosmetics was sufficient to establish a direct 
 
 203. Id. at *2. 
 204. Id. at *2–3. 
 205. Id. at *3. 
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 207. Id. (citing Farah v. Pramil S.R.L. (Farah TTAB Decision), No. 92032341, 2008 
WL 853844 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 29, 2008)). 
 208. Id. at *4. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2006). 
 212. Farah, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24184, at *5; see also Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 
F.3d 1092, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that an opposer must meet these two 
judicially created requirements to establish standing under the Lanham Act); Int’l 
Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 727 F.2d 1087, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(noting that there is no requirement that damage be proved for an opposer to 
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commercial interest in the mark; thus, Pramil had standing to 
petition to cancel Farah’s OMIC PLUS mark for cosmetics.213  The 
TTAB also noted that the district court’s injunction did not prohibit 
Pramil from using its OMIC mark; rather, the injunction simply 
ordered Pramil not to use the OMIC PLUS mark or any 
reproduction, copy, or colorable imitation thereof.214  The Federal 
Circuit found no error in the TTAB’s conclusion regarding Pramil’s 
standing to file the cancellation petition.215
On the issue of collateral estoppel, the Federal Circuit explained 
that collateral estoppel precludes “the relitigation of issues only when 
those issues were ‘actually litigated’ in a prior lawsuit,” but the 
underlying issues cannot be litigated when a default judgment is 
issued.216  Thus, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s finding that 
the district court’s default judgment did not collaterally estop Pramil 
from pursuing the cancellation proceeding.217
The court also dismissed Farah’s argument that Pramil failed to 
carry its burden of proof for the priority-of-use element of its petition 
to cancel because Farah did not establish that Pramil applied its mark 
to the goods themselves or that the goods were sold to the public.218  
Under section 45 of the Lanham Act,219 the term “use in commerce” 
means “the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of 
trade.”220  The Federal Circuit explained, 
 [A] mark is “use[d] in commerce,” when:  (1) “it is placed in any 
manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated 
therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of 
the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on 
documents associated with the goods or their sale,” and (2) “the 
goods are sold or transported in commerce.”221
Thus, the court noted, under the statute, Pramil need not make a 
showing of either (1) an application of the mark to the goods 
themselves or (2) that the goods were sold to the public.222  The 
 
 213. Farah, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24184, at *5. 
 214. Id. at *5–6. 
 215. Id. at *6. 
 216. Id. at *7; see Lee ex rel. Lee v. United States, 124 F.3d 1291, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (explaining that, when a judgment is issued in a case as the result of a default, 
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under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because those underlying issues have not 
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 217. Farah, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24184, at *7–8. 
 218. Id. at *8–9. 
 219. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
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 221. Farah, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24184, at *8–9 (quoting § 1127). 
 222. Id. at *8. 
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TTAB found that Pramil’s prior use was established by proof that 
6000 units of [its] OMIC product were sold in 1994 to a company in 
Florida.223  During the TTAB proceeding, Pramil’s witness testified 
that “OMIC” was marked on these products.224  In addition, the 
invoice for that sale identified the products with the OMIC mark and 
the current product packaging clearly displayed the mark.225  Because 
Farah did not provide any evidence to the contrary in support of its 
argument, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision 
regarding Pramil’s priority of use.226
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected Farah’s allegation that Pramil 
had not proven its continuous use of the mark.227  Farah asserted that 
Pramil’s evidence showed use of the mark only from 1994 to 1996 
and from 2000 to 2004, and that, because of an unexplained four-
year gap, Pramil failed to carry its burden of establishing continuous 
use of its mark.228  The TTAB stated that abandonment is a defense to 
evidence of prior use so Farah bore the burden to prove 
abandonment.229  The TTAB found that Pramil’s witness explained 
gap and “testified that Pramil’s use of the mark ha[d] been 
continuous since 1994, with no interruption.”230  Farah offered no 
contrary evidence; the TTAB consequently held that Farah failed to 
prove an abandonment defense.231  The Federal Circuit affirmed this 
holding and also rejected Farah’s argument that the witness 
testimony was not enough to prove Pramil’s continuous use of the 
mark.232  The Federal Circuit thus denied Farah’s appeal and affirmed 
the TTAB’s decision to cancel Farah’s application to register his 
mark.233
CONCLUSION 
With respect to trademark decisions, the Federal Circuit was 
relatively quiet in 2008.  The court chose to issue only one 
precedential decision,234 and three of the four decisions by the court 
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on substantive trademark issues were issued without opinion.235  
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit’s analyses of the lower tribunal’s 
decisions in these cases—especially its disagreement with and 
clarification of certain issues in the lower tribunals’ decisions—
should be of interest to practitioners.  Of particular importance are 
the court’s finding in Nasalok that counterclaims for cancellation of a 
trademark registration are not compulsory in cases where 
infringement has been asserted,236 and the court’s reversal in Sakar 
International, Inc., of the Court of International Trade’s decision 
asserting jurisdiction over challenges to fines issued in connection 
with the seizure of counterfeit goods.237
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